Abstract:
INTRODUCTION
Biotechnology is progressing at an unprecedented pace promising to bring tremendous benefits by responding to health, socio-economic,
and environmental challenges. At the same time,
cutting-edge life sciences advances raise multifaceted social, legal, ethical, and security concerns,
including the risk of accidental or deliberate misuse. Reconciling the expected benefits with potential risks requires effective governance of
dual-use life science research. The US National
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB),
a consultative committee to the US Government
defines ‘dual-use research’ as “the development
of new technologies and the generation of information with the potential for benevolent and malevolent purposes” noting that “virtually all life
sciences research has dual use potential” (1). To
facilitate policy-making in this area at national as
well as institutional level, the NSABB has developed a criterion for identifying dual-use research
of concern (DURC): “life sciences research that,
based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be
directly misapplied to pose a significant threat
with broad potential consequences to public
health and safety, agricultural crops and other
plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security” (2, 3).
Dual-use risk management needs to be multi-layered and flexible; regulation per se is not sufficient to capture the wide-ranging security implications of cutting-edge life science advances. Fostering a shared understanding within the life science community of the risk that the life sciences
could be misused in ways that cause harm to humans, animals, or plants is key. Life sciences
stakeholders have a duty to be aware of the potential for misuse of scientific findings and of their
obligation to help inform and shape critical policy
decisions about biological security in the life sciences (1).On the other hand, policymakers should
also seek to strike an appropriate balance between national security and unhindered scientific
research when considering DURC governance
options.
