Life sciences professional responsibility in an age of dual-use research

Abstract

INTRODUCTION Biotechnology is progressing at an unprecedented pace promising to bring tremendous benefits by responding to health, socio-economic, and environmental challenges. At the same time, cutting-edge life sciences advances raise multifaceted social, legal, ethical, and security concerns, including the risk of accidental or deliberate misuse. Reconciling the expected benefits with potential risks requires effective governance of dual-use life science research. The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), a consultative committee to the US Government defines ‘dual-use research’ as “the development of new technologies and the generation of information with the potential for benevolent and malevolent purposes” noting that “virtually all life sciences research has dual use potential” (1). To facilitate policy-making in this area at national as well as institutional level, the NSABB has developed a criterion for identifying dual-use research of concern (DURC): “life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security” (2, 3). Dual-use risk management needs to be multi-layered and flexible; regulation per se is not sufficient to capture the wide-ranging security implications of cutting-edge life science advances. Fostering a shared understanding within the life science community of the risk that the life sciences could be misused in ways that cause harm to humans, animals, or plants is key. Life sciences stakeholders have a duty to be aware of the potential for misuse of scientific findings and of their obligation to help inform and shape critical policy decisions about biological security in the life sciences (1).On the other hand, policymakers should also seek to strike an appropriate balance between national security and unhindered scientific research when considering DURC governance options.